Michel Monten's Style in His "Essays"

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Annotation: This article discusses the methods and metaphors used by the author in "Essays" by Michel Montaigne, a lawyer and thinker who had a place in Renaissance French literature in the 16th century. In "Essays", the writer wrote down his life experiences and the methods and metaphors his still is interesting and relevant today.
Key words: methodical, fortuitous, organization, theoretical, 'objective' goal, discourse, doubt, different images, notion, concept, connotation

Introduction

Method Michel Montaigne's method is not methodical, it is based on encounter and chance. The only possible reading of the Essays is not linear but fragmented and fortuitous. Montaigne never seeks himself, he simply meets himself: "I do not find myself where I seek myself; and I find myself more by meeting than by the inquisition of my judgment" (I.10.40). The author of the Essays does not have indeed a well determined direction, he carries out meetings at random during his readings. His thinking itself changes according to the situations that are offered to Montaigne. The natural form of his mind is undulating, floating, even disjointed. It would then be absurd to regulate it and to subject it to a reasoned method: "it is a subject wonderfully vain, diverse and undulating, that man. It is difficult to to base judgment constant and uniform judgment" (I.1.9). Who claims to be interested to the universal must therefore inevitably adapt his thought to his thought to this empirical reality. Montaigne is far from being methodical in the organization of his thoughts and his writings. This does not mean that that he is not interested is not interested not in the idea of method. Rather than a practice, the method is therefore for him an object of reflection. Before Descartes, Montaigne offers us one of the best examples of what we could call "subjectivation" of the method. With Montaigne, we discover for example that doubt belongs to any research, and that the subject must insert himself in his own scientific or intellectual process; in short, from a pseudo-objectivism leading to the universalism whose presence could be detected in Machiavelli, La Ramée and Bodin, the subject realizes all of a sudden that the method is a subjective and theoretical exercise where the concept of truth only reflects a mental process leading to a relativistic vision of the world and its history. This contribution of the subject in the method obviously starts obviously by a theory of the self and more particularly of the construction of the self. Only the subject is capable of judgment, and the discovery of the self forms a necessary step towards the establishment of this judgment.

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Main part

Montaigne realises that the objectivity of the event vision distorts reality, and only an introspective truth is possible and desirable: "I have leu in Titus Livius a hundred things that such a one did not leu. Plutarch has read a hundred things in it, in addition to what I, I have known to read, and, in the event, to in addition to what the author had put there" (I.26.156). These continuous interactions between Montaigne and his time, Montaigne and his reading, Montaigne and the other, finally produce a new world view and a new conception of truth (and the means to original for the time. If Montaigne draws some conclusions from his experiences from his experiences, they have the particularity of being all relative. Montaigne understands that, in the end, "it does not matter not only that one the thing, but how one how it is seen" (I.14.67). For Montaigne the angle influences the vision, and the bias forms the truth of things.

History, science and all knowledge in general acquire a malleability that was hitherto hitherto unknown. Knowledge, for a Machiavelli, a La Ramée or a Bodin, represented an Bodin, represented an 'objective' goal to be reached, the method being only a means to discover a law or a hidden truth. With Montaigne, we understand that method and truth are intrinsically linked and form two sides of the same same the same coin. Even reason the name that will take on a methodological form after Descartes only manifests itself as flexible and deformable artifice: "I call reason this appearance of discourse that everyone forges in himself: this reason, of the condition of which there may be a hundred opposites around a the same subject, it is an instrument of lead and wax wax, extendable, bendable and adaptable to all angles and measures; it only remains the sufficiency of knowing how to bypass "(II.12.565).

Discourse regains the privileged position that it knew at the beginning the beginning of the century, albeit on a new on a new basis: it is no longer the beauty of the the beauty of the sentences (the rhetorical effects) the method, but the assembly and the logical of the discourse. The history of the world and of man - his position in relation to the other and to the world - now depends on the the power and persuasiveness of methodological discourse. History and science are no longer objects subject to analysis, but reflect the success of persuasion through method: "It is the matter of history, naked and unformed; each one can make his own profit from it as much as he has the profit from it as much as he has understanding" (II.10.417) admits Montaigne The "shaping" of the form" of the history of man and his habitat - the world - is the result of the method, and the result of such a formal organisation is called knowledge.

Analyses and Discussions

It is probable that the political, social and cosmological chaos of the second half of the sixteenth century, and the increasing number of cracks in the humanist edifice, produced Montaign's doubt and his reflection on the idea of a method to be followed in order to arrive at knowledge of beings and things. It has been thought that this doubt is a method. It is true that there is a methodical doubt, but, if it were also the method of method, it was certainly a method which led nowhere. Montaigne has not built anything out of this doubt; he keeps on conjecturing and only succeeds in projecting a few furtive images of

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himself. Doubt is not yet method in Montaigne doubt is not yet method in Montaigne, it certainly represents an important contribution to the method but should rather be considered as the product of a discovery of subjectivity that claims its own truth truth and refuses any generalisation. Montaignian postulate: the fortuitous is at the heart of any scientific or scientific or philosophical approach. The idea of a method that would be applied systematically is systematically applied is by this principle excluded from all human investigation. Discoveries are themselves the result of a purely accidental course (Hartle). If experience always represents a danger for the method, it is on the other hand desirable in a system built on the idea of contingency. In such a system, particular experiences cannot be accumulated but replace each other by exclusion.

Metaphors If the word appears only twice in all the Essays, the thing, the use of metaphor, as knows it every reader of the Essays, is omnipresent in Montaigne's prose, since both well the major characteristic of his style is to be imagined: "thought, image, with him it is all one" affirmed already Sainte-Beuve, who added: "one does not receives the ideas only in images, and we have them and one has them, at each moment, under different images, easy and transparent however ". This observation seems to have been made from the very beginning by his very first readers, who, according to Montaigne, would have reproached him: "You are too spaced in figures" (III.5.875). The list of figures in which the term appears for the first time ("Oyez say metonomy, metaphor, allegory and other such names of the grammar, does it not seem that one means some rare and pellegrine form of language? These are titles which touch the babble of your chambriere", I.51.307) proves that Montaigne, put at good school, that of the rhetoric of the colleges of which he makes fun here as elsewhere, understands the term according to the restrictive sense that the the treaties of his time, and not in the very extensive meaning given to it by Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric of Aristotle.

The metaphor or translatio (Cicero, de Or. III, 155.) consists into use, in the absence of any term marking analogy, a concrete word, which is most often image, in order to evoke a notion or a notion or a concept (old age "attaches more wrinkles to our the mind than to the face", III.2.817); to terms of Fouquelin there is "translation there is "translation" "when by the similar, the similar one is understood: it is to say when a word proper to mean something, is usurped for another other similar to it" (364, ed. Goyet): there is there is "no love, or very rare, who, as they grow older, do not feel sour and musty" (III.2.817); "I am on the bottom of the vessel, which smells tantost the bottom and the lye" (II.37.784). One even surprises Montaigne sensitive to the handling of the figure, since in the second passage where he evokes it, he shows that he has well perceived the phenomenon of the lexicalized metaphor: "Of some of these words that I have just sorted out, we perceive the energy of it more hardly, especially as the use and the frequency have in no way aviled us and made vulgar the grace. As in our commonplace, it meets there excellent frases and of the metaphors of which the beauty fades of old age, and the color is tarnished by too ordinary handling" (III.5.874). Villey thus remarks that in rereading himself Montaigne deleted goust and gouster more than 40 times, "there is no doubt," he says, "that for him these words no longer had much of an image" (EM, V,335). One of the ways to remotivate metaphors is transplantation, agricultural metaphor often spun in the

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Essays: "the forms of speaking, like the herbs, grow stronger and strengthen by transplanting them" (III.5.874).

As a reader, Montaigne likes images, as the chapter "On Virgil's verses" attests; and as a writer, he likes to use them, much more in the form of metaphors than comparisons, moreover, according to F. Gray or Montaigne Baraz. If he always seems to hesitate to put in relation an element and its image with the help of a term of analogy, it is that "bad prescher of commune "(II.17.637), refusing to to play the "cathedrants", Montaigne tastes to the elliptical and allusive tricks: "Celuy qui dict tout, il nous allusive tricks: "Celuy qui dict tout, il nous saoul et nous desgouste" (III.5.880). This is why he will always show a clear preference for metaphors in absentia, which ellipses the element compared element to let only the comparing element appear: an comparing: efficient way to pile up "only the testes" (I.40.251), in order to achieve this "short and tight" style (I.26.171 ; I.40.252; III.9.994) that he likes in ancient authors and seeks in his own his own expression; sure means also to reach this poetic expression that he discovers in the "best ancient prose" (III.9.995), to utter words "no longer of wind, but of wind, but of flesh and bones "(let us greet the bold metaphor...) which "mean more than they do not say" (III.5.873).

Another advantage of the metaphor in absentia : the element compared (in the last quotation, these strong words, strong, lively, of weight, these sincere words, truthful words, it would be difficult to exhaust the connotation) is supposed to exist, but it escapes the language, it is connoted much more than denoted. Within the " perennial branloire ", our "impremeditated and fortuitous philosopher fortuitous" intends to evoke the moving, the indeterminate without resorting to the vocabulary stopped by the school refusing the mode of reasoning by induction or by deduction, he opts for the for the reasoning by anology ; and the metaphor in absentia constitutes the privileged instrument privileged instrument of this seizure of the reality, which is done in and by the image.

Conclusions

Phenomena, abstract notions abstract notions, Montaigne will never give us the idea, he delivers the equivalent sensitive to our imaginations. And in fact, Montaigne is a virtuoso in handling this language at the highest level of imagery (see the attempt of taxonomy operated by Thibaudet), which beyond the obvious effects of obvious seduction ("We do not know how to distinguish the skin from the shirt", III.10.1011) constitutes for him a heuristic tool, a means of approaching as closely as possible realities that he often complains of having difficulty in defining and characterizing. "All things are held by some similarity" (III.13.1070) and in this mutability, this indecision, this general uncertainty of the world and the self as of the words to designate them, following the example of that of Horace, its spirit "crochets and furette all the store of the words and the figures to represent itself" (III.5.873).

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